Category: PSM / RMP (page 1 of 9)

Compliance in a time of COVID-19 Pandemic

The whole country is facing a very difficult situation right now as we all deal with both the COVID-19 disease and the effects of government’s response to it. Some customers (especially restaurant service) are seeing a 2/3rds drop in their business. Other sectors, such as Grocery, are seeing unprecedented demand. Either way, that’s a recipe for chaos.

One of the first cultural victims of chaos is usually the safety / regulatory community. We’re easy to ignore whether the reason is “we’re facing layoffs and bankruptcy” or “orders are up 300% and we don’t have time for this.”

On top of that, in a good-faith effort to re-assure the regulated community that they understand the burdens we’re under right now, the EPA drafted a policy saying they would use discretion on compliance during the pandemic.

That EPA policy was interpreted by some (the environmental lobby mostly) as a blanket waiver of all regulations allowing the regulated community to pollute at will. More significantly worrying to me personally was the calls, emails & texts I started getting Friday where people in our refrigeration community were being “told” this temporary EPA policy was being used to avoid compliance with their PSM / RMP obligations.

With that in mind, let’s look at what it actually says, shall we?

 

What is the EPA actually saying?

Here’s the actual EPA press release. Here’s the actual EPA guidance memorandum. Here’s the important part:

  1. Entities should make every effort to comply with their environmental compliance obligations.
  2. If compliance is not reasonably practicable, facilities with environmental compliance obligations should:
    1. Act responsibly under the circumstances in order to minimize the effects and duration of any noncompliance caused by COVID-19;
    2. Identify the specific nature and dates of the noncompliance;
    3. Identify how COVID-19 was the cause of the noncompliance, and the decisions and actions taken in response, including best efforts to comply and steps taken to come into compliance at the earliest opportunity;
    4. Return to compliance as soon as possible; and
    5. Document the information, action, or condition specified in a. through d

The consequences of the pandemic may constrain the ability of regulated entities to perform routine compliance monitoring,  integrity testing, sampling,  laboratory analysis, training, and reporting or certification. … In general, the EPA does not expect to seek penalties for violations of routine compliance monitoring, integrity testing, sampling, laboratory analysis, training, and reporting or certification obligations in situations where the EPA agrees that COVID-19 was the cause of the noncompliance and the entity provides supporting documentation to the EPA upon request.

 

What does that mean for us in  PSM/RMP covered processes?

Short answer: Not a lot. Long answer follows…

 

Here’s some examples of what it might let you avoid a fine for:

  • Getting an annual compressor vibration analysis a few weeks late because all your contractor’s technicians were ill due to COVID-19
  • Performing a routine MI inspection late because your technicians were ill due to COVID-19.
  • Delaying some training, a compliance audit, PHA revalidation, etc. because of COVID-19 related travel restrictions.

 

Here’s some examples of what it definitely WILL NOT let you avoid a fine for:

  • Starting up equipment without a proper Pre-Startup Safety Review. (If you have time to start it, you have time to check it)
  • Making changes without implementing your written Management of Change policy. (If you have time to change it, you have time to do so safely)
  • Addressing existing recommendations and known problems.
    • If your SOPs have been out of compliance since IIAR 7 was published in 2013, this memo is NOT going to help you avoid fines because COVID-19 doesn’t explain the delay.
    • If your PHA hasn’t been updated to reflect the 2012 IIAR Compliance guidance, this memo is NOT going to help you avoid fines because COVID-19 doesn’t explain the delay.
    • If you haven’t provided documentation that your Operators and/or Contractors are properly trained, this memo is NOT going to help you avoid fines because COVID-19 doesn’t explain the delay.
    • If you have rusted pipes, and have for several years, but you still haven’t gotten around to dealing with them, this memo is NOT going to help you avoid fines because COVID-19 doesn’t explain the delay.
  • Delaying, or failing to report a release of ammonia. It does not affect the requirements to REPORT releases.

Accidental Releases: Nothing in this temporary policy relieves any entity from the responsibility to prevent, respond to, or report accidental releases of oil, hazardous substances, hazardous chemicals, hazardous waste, and other pollutants, as required by federal law, or should be read as a willingness to exercise enforcement discretion in the wake of such a release.

 

Closing thoughts

Unless you are in a very unique position, this EPA memo means very little to you at all. Here’s examples of two clients that it does affect:

  • Scheduled 5yr MI delayed: The client has delayed their scheduled 5yr MI inspection & audit because of travel restrictions in their state. Their intent is to schedule it as soon as it is reasonably safe to do so once this pandemic has passed. If they document how COVID-19 caused this delay, this memo helps them feel confident that the EPA understands the issue.
  • Compliance Audits delayed: The client still has until June to meet their 3yr date but had to delay their scheduled March compliance audits due to travel restrictions. Assuming the issue has passed, and they can reschedule before they hit their June requirement, they have no issue at all. If the issue continues such that they will not be able to complete their 3yr compliance audits before the deadline this EPA policy helps them if:
    1. The audit activities that can be done remotely are done before the 3yr date, and
    2. The audit activities that cannot be done remotely are done as soon as reasonably possible after the pandemic has passed. They will also need to document how COVID-19 caused this delay.

IIAR 2 202x Public Review 1

The IIAR has released a proposed draft of IIAR 2 Safety Standard for Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems for public review. Here’s the notice:

March 20th, 2020

To:

IIAR Members

Re:

First (1st) Public Review of Standard BSR/IIAR 2-202x, Safety Standard for Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems.

A first (1st) public review of draft standard BSR/IIAR 2-202x, Safety Standard for Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems is now open. The International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (IIAR) invites you to make comments on the draft standard. Substantive changes resulting from this public review will also be provided for comment in a future public review if necessary.

BSR/IIAR 2-202x specifies the minimum safety criteria for design of closed-circuit ammonia refrigeration systems. It presupposes that the persons who use the document have a working knowledge of the functionality of ammonia refrigerating system(s) and basic ammonia refrigerating practices and principles. This standard is intended for those who develop, define, implement and/or review the design of ammonia refrigeration systems. This standard shall apply only to closed-circuit refrigeration systems utilizing ammonia as the refrigerant. It is not intended to supplant existing safety codes (e.g., model mechanical or fire codes) where provisions in these may take precedence.

IIAR has designated the revised standard as BSR/IIAR 2-202x. Upon approval by the ANSI Board of Standards Review, the standard will receive a different name that reflects this approval date.

We invite you to participate in the first (1st) public review of BSR/IIAR 2-202x. IIAR will use the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) procedures to develop evidence of consensus among affected parties. ANSI’s role in the revision process is to establish and enforce standards of openness, balance, due process and harmonization with other American and International Standards. IIAR is the ANSI-accredited standards developer for BSR/IIAR 2-202x, and is responsible for the technical content of the standard.

This site includes links to the following attachments:

The 45-day public review period will be from March 20th, 2020 to May 4th, 2020. Comments are due no later than May 4th, 2020.

Thank you for your interest in the public review of BSR/IIAR 2-202x, Safety Standard for Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems.

There are MANY proposed changes. I’ll include a full list of the proposed changes at the end of the post, but here are some highlights:

  • Requirements for System Signage became a little simpler
  • Ammonia detection requirements have changed
    • Most installations now need two detectors in a machine room
    • Installation & Testing for detectors outside machine rooms now refer to external RAGAGEPs.
    • “Level 1” detection now requires liquid & hot gas shutoff at 150ppm
    • Requires AHJ approval if not installing ammonia detection in “Areas Other than Machinery Rooms”
  • New requirements for permanently installed Hoses and Corrugated Metal Fittings to ensure they meet ISO 10380 or ARPM IP-14

 

It’s important that YOU read these changes and make your voice heard if you have any input on them. 

 

Full change list of the normative sections of the standard below…


Continue reading

CSB’s NEW Chemical Incident Reporting Rule is FINAL

“U.S. Chemical Safety Board and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) has approved a final rule on accidental release reporting. The CSB has posted a prepublication version of the final rule… The official version should be published early next week in the Federal Register.

The rule requires prompt reports to the CSB from owners or operators of facilities that experience an accidental release of a regulated substance or extremely hazardous that results in a death, serious injury or substantial property damage. The CSB anticipates that these reports will provide the agency with key information important to the CSB in making prompt deployment decisions…

The rule is required by the CSB’s enabling legislation but was not issued during the first 20 years of CSB operations. Last year, a court ordered the CSB to finalize a rule within a year. “

What it means: If the incident resulted in Death, Serious Injury or Substantial Property Damage ($1kk or more) then you have to report the incident to the CSB (via phone 202- 261-7600 or email report@csb.gov) within 30 minutes. The report must include:

1604.4 Information required in an accidental release report submitted to the CSB
1604.4 The report required under §1604.3(c) must include the following information regarding an accidental release as applicable:
1604.4(a) The name of, and contact information for, the owner/operator;
1604.4(b) The name of, and contact information for, the person making the report;
1604.4(c) The location information and facility identifier;
1604.4(d) The approximate time of the accidental release;
1604.4(e) A brief description of the accidental release;
1604.4(f) An indication whether one or more of the following has occurred: (1) fire; (2) explosion; (3) death; (4) serious injury; or (5) property damage.
1604.4(g) The name of the material(s) involved in the accidental release, the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number(s), or other appropriate identifiers;
1604.4(h) If known, the amount of the release;
1604.4(i) If known, the number of fatalities;
1604.4(j) If known, the number of serious injuries;
1604.4(k) Estimated property damage at or outside the stationary source;
1604.4(l) Whether the accidental release has resulted in an evacuation order impacting members of the general public and others, and, if known:
1604.4(l)(1) the number of persons evacuated;
1604.4(l)(2) approximate radius of the evacuation zone;
1604.4(l)(3) the type of person subject to the evacuation order (i.e., employees, members of the general public, or both).

The good news is that if you have to report the incident to the NRC then you can skip reporting all the above data and simply report the NRC case number you’re given during the NRC call.

This new requirement takes effect 30 days from the posting in the Federal Register so ACT NOW. It’s important that you update your program because there are enforcement penalties associated with not following this new rule…

1604.5(b) Violation of this part is subject to enforcement pursuant to the authorities of 42 U.S.C. 7413 and 42 U.S.C. 7414, which may include
1604.5(b)(1) Administrative penalties;
1604.5(b)(2) Civil action; or
1604.5(b)(3) Criminal action.

 

What should I do? 

If you use the template program, the hard work has already been done FOR YOU. Just open up the template directory on Google Drive and follow these steps for your program:

  • In \Reference\ add new directory \Reference\CSB\ and place “CSB Reporting Accidental Releases – prepublicationcopy 020320.pdf” in it. You can get it from the templates directory or from the EPA link.
  • In \Reference\CFR\ add “40CFR1604 – Hazardous substances Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.doc” from the templates directory.
  • Update the Incident Investigation element Written Plan to the 020720 version from the templates directory.
  • Update the \01 – EPA RMP\ Definitions file to the 020720 version from the templates directory.
  • Train all Responsible Persons and affected management on the new policies.
  • Document the changes in your DOC-Cert in accordance with the Implementation Policy: Managing Procedure / Document Changes found in the MOC/PSSR element Written Plan.

Note: If you have instructions for Agency Notifications somewhere outside your Incident Investigation plan, you’ll need to update them to include the CSB contact information there too. Feel free to use the text in the Incident Investigation element Written Plan, Implementation Policy: Agency Notifications.

 

Why use the “buddy system” during Line Openings?

Most LEO (Line & Equipment Opening) policy a.k.a. “Line Break” policies require a second person away from the work but in the immediate area. It is reasonable to ask why the procedure demands this.

Put as simply as possible:

  1. PSM/RMP and IIAR 7 require procedures for Line & Equipment Openings. (or IIAR 7 alone if you have under 10k pounds)
  2. The PHA asks questions that identify hazards which result in administrative controls aka procedures. Those procedures will have to control the unique hazards identified in the PHA.
  3. RAGAGEP for procedures (such as IIAR 7) require the buddy system be addressed in Line & Equipment Opening procedures.
  4. HazMat & Firefighting history show it is useful.
  5. Human Nature tells us that people tend to hold each other accountable.

 

Let’s work through this step-by-step

1. PSM/RMP requires us to have a procedure:

1910.119(f)(4) The employer shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees.

Put another way: We have to develop a written procedure on Line & Equipment Openings which everyone must follow.

 

2. Hazards identified during a PHA are often controlled with Administrative controls, such as SOPs. SOP content therefore must address the hazards identified in the PHA. Some examples:

…the Ammonia exposure increases while the operator is using an APR/SCBA? (II.8) This is what makes us mandate the use of a personal NH3 detector during line openings and leak investigations.

…there is inadequate isolation prior to maintenance? (HF.3) …the Ammonia pump-out for a length of piping or for a piece of equipment is incomplete? (PO.1) This is why SOPs include a pressure check to confirm pumpdown. This is also why the LEO procedure (and permit) require a written SOP & permit to check the effectiveness of the procedure.

…an injured worker is unable to summon assistance? (HF.56) This (among other reasons) is why we require a Buddy System. The LEO policy, in the General Precautions section, states “A buddy-system is used for all LEO procedures. The second person must be trained to initiate emergency action and must be stationed close enough to observe the activity but far enough away to ensure that they would not be endangered by an accidental release.”

 

3. The RAGAGEP for procedures IIAR 7-2019 has this requirement:

4.4.2 Buddy System. Operating procedures shall indicate when the buddy system shall be practiced in performing work on the ammonia refrigeration system

A4.4.2-The buddy system should be practiced for operations where there is the potential that ammonia could be released, for example, operations which involve opening ammonia refrigeration equipment or piping. The buddy system should also be practiced during emergency operations involving ammonia releases.

 

4. HazMat & Firefighting history: Hazardous Materials teams and Firefighters have long used a 2-person team for increased safety. To some degree, this is enshrined in OSHA rules in 1910.134(g)(3)…

1910.134(g)(3) Procedures for IDLH atmospheres. For all IDLH atmospheres, the employer shall ensure that:

1910.134(g)(3)(i) One employee or, when needed, more than one employee is located outside the IDLH atmosphere;

1910.134(g)(3)(ii) Visual, voice, or signal line communication is maintained between the employee(s) in the IDLH atmosphere and the employee(s) located outside the IDLH atmosphere;

While we don’t INTEND to work inside a IDLH atmosphere during a LEO procedure, the possibility certainly exists if something goes wrong. The “buddy system” allows the person performing the LEO to focus on the work while the second person remains in the area situationally aware and ready to respond in the event that the situation changes or something goes wrong.

 

5. Human Nature: The LEO policy is written around accountability. The policy requires that we demonstrate to a second person that we’ve followed the policy and adequately prepared for the work before the LEO occurs.  The “buddy system” tends to keep the actions “in-line” during the actual work.

Note: While it’s certainly possible  – from a regulatory view – that you could have certain specific LEO procedures that did not require a “buddy,” you would have to be able to document how you managed to address all of the issues outlined above without the second person.

Thanks to Bryan Haywood of SaftEng.net and Gary Smith of ASTI (Ammonia Safety Training Institute) for their time and thoughts in helping review this post.

Trump EPA goes LIVE with new RMP rule: Is this finally the end of the saga?

The story so far…

Dec 2016: Outgoing Obama EPA releases changes to the RMP rule on the way out the door.

Apr 2017: Incoming Trump EPA puts the RMP rule changes on hold.

Jun 2017: Trump EPA further delays the RMP rule changes.

May 2018: Trump EPA proposes new RMP rule changes, reversing Obama changes.

Aug 2018: DC District Court reverses Trump Rule and re-instates Obama rule essentially making it the existing rule with compliance dates in the past. Trump EPA is basically told that it can change the rules, but it needs to follow different procedures to do that. Trump admin appeals and the rule changes are put on hold.

Sep 2018: Trump admin loses appeals. Obama RMP rule changes are officially LIVE. Trump EPA announces that they will follow the different procedures and change the rule the right way. (Not-so-secretly, the entire EPA is told NOT to enforce the new rule, but out of an abundance of caution, most RMP adherents implement the changes anyway. After all, it IS the law.)

Dec 2019: Trump EPA officially posts the new rule and places it in the CFR making it LIVE on 12/19/19. (See links at the end of the post)

 

So, where do we stand now?

Ok, we’ve got a new RMP rule. It appears to have gone through the correct rulemaking process. It’s been published in the Federal Register making it the law of the land.

 

So, what do we do now?

Well, let’s be honest; the Trump administration IS GOING TO GET SUED over this. What happens then? Who knows!? If you follow the courts in modern America, you know there is very little that can be accurately forecasted.

What we do know is that we have a new rule. The new rule appears to have been done correctly with sound documentation as to the reasoning for the changes. In my opinion, the new rule will LIKELY hold up in court. Even if it doesn’t, it is highly unlikely the EPA could get away with fining / citing people for not following a court-reinstated rule under such a cloud of confusion.

In any case, the new rule is easier to follow and makes more sense than the Obama EPA rule changes did. It reverts the majority of the RMP rule to match the PSM rule where they SHARE jurisdiction. The only substantive changes are to the EPA-specific areas where the EPA alone holds jurisdiction.

 

Ok, so how do I comply with this new rule?

If you do use our template system, I’ve got some good news for you! This is where using a set of open-sourced, professionally curated templates really shines. ALMOST ALL THE WORK has been done FOR YOU!

  • To improve your understanding of the new rule, read how we changed the program to meet the new requirements. This will help you to train your colleagues on them.
  • Replace existing copies of the affected Written Plans / Forms, taking a moment to look at the changes between the older versions and the new ones.
    1. Implement new EAP-C form.
    2. Modify the MI-EL1 EAP/ERP line to reflect the new text.
  • Train all Responsible Persons and affected management on the new policies.

Note: Estimated time for the above is about 2-4 hours depend on how well you know your PSM/RMP program.

 

On the other hand, If you don’t use our template system, you’re going to have to re-create the work I’ve already done:

  • Skip to the end of this article to get the links to the new information.
  • Read the 83-page Federal Register notice and make a series of notes about the new requirements. You can probably skip the 109 footnotes for now.
  • Compare those new requirements to the version of the RMP rule your program is CURRENLY written to comply with; whether that’s the pre-Obama, Obama, or Trump proposed version.
  • Starting at the beginning of your program, read through each of your Element Written Plans and see what changes have to be made. Refer to your notes from the first step. (You may wish to read how we changed our program to meet the new requirements)
  • Update / alter your program to meet these new requirements.
  • Train on these new changes

Note: Estimated time for the above is about 40-80 hours depend on how well you know your PSM/RMP program and the EPA RMP rule.

 

Template Program changes in detail

Please note, where not specifically shown below all affected Element Written Plans had their CFR section updated to the current 12/19/19 CFR.

Element What Changed Changes to Program Templates
01 – RMP
  1. A few definitions were deleted
  2. Some compliance dates and RMP references were changed
  3. Various Program 2 Changes
  4. Public meetings changes
  5. RMP Filing changes regarding 3rd party compliance audits, public meetings, etc.
  6. Removed significant amounts of publicly available information
  1. As our definition file isn’t limited to EPA sources, no changes were made to the template program documents.
  2. Previously there were sections about the Obama-era law that had a 2021 date tag – these sections were either deleted (because they were removed) or the date tag was removed.
  3. The element written plans are designed around Program 3, so no changes were made in them however all relevant CFR sections were updated.
  4. Updated the Element Written Plan to address these issues
  5. Updated the CFR to reflect the changes.
  6. Updated the Element Written Plan to address these issues
02 – EP N/A None
03 – PSI
  1. Removed the explicit requirement to keep PSI up to date.
  1. While we updated the CFR text, this is sort of implicit in the MOC/PSSR program and the very nature of PSM, so no changes made to the Element Written Plan.
04 – PHA
  1. Removed a nebulous requirement to look for “any other potential failure scenarios”
  2. Removed a section on alternative risk management for chemical / petro plants.
  1. While we updated the CFR text, this is sort of implicit in the idea of a PHA, so no changes were made in the Element Written Plan.
  2. These changes did not cover the NH3 refrigeration industry, so no changes were needed in the Element Written Plan.
  3. Since the explicit PSI “up to date” requirement was removed from the PSI section, it was removed from the PSI checklist in the PHA What-If checklists.
05 – SOP N/A None
06 – OT
  1. Removed an explicit requirement that “supervisors with process operational responsibilities” were covered under this program.
  1. We believe that operators under this element are defined by their function not their title / job position, so no changes were needed in the Element Written Plan.
07 – CQ N/A None
08 – MI No changes to RMP requirements
  1. The MI-EL1 section covering recurring PSM tasks in EAP/ERP was updated to remove the 2021 date codes. While the 10yr Field Exercise frequency is now just a suggestion (rather than a mandate) we’ve kept it in as a good practice.
09 – HW N/A None
10 – MOC / PSSR No changes to RMP requirements
  1. The procedural section “Implementation Policy: Managing Equipment / Facility Changes and using form MOC-1” includes a chart on possible changes to RMP-required information based on an MOC. The reference to “public information” has been removed from this chart.
11 – II
  1. Removed explicit requirements for incident location, time, all relevant facts, chronological order, amount released, number of injuries, etc.
  2. Removed a requirement that Incident Investigations be completed within a year
  1. While we removed these requirements from the CFR section, we believe they are still important for Incident Investigations and they’re already required by relevant RAGAGEP, so no changes were made to the Element Written Plan, the investigation instructions, or the Form-IIR Incident Investigation form.
  2. While we can’t imagine this wouldn’t occur naturally in a functioning process safety program, we removed the requirement. The program – as written – already suggests interim reports when investigations are lagging.
12 – EPR
  1. Lots of changes here: Modified information sharing requirements with responders, modified frequency of field exercises, modified scope of field and tabletop exercises, documentation requirements, compliance dates, etc.
  1. These changes were all incorporated in the Element Written Plan.
  2. To improve program performance, a new form was created “EAP-C Local Authority Coordination Record.” This form was also included in the Element Written Plan.
13 – CA
  1. Removed requirements for 3rd party audits
  1. These changes were all incorporated in the Element Written Plan.
14 – TS
  1. Modified text in the “CBI” section to reflect new wording in the updated rule.
  1. While it’s been changed in the CFR text, it requires no change to the Element Written Plans.

Item-by-Item changes:

  • Reference\EPA Reference\ has been updated with a PDF of the Register Notice.
  • Reference\CFR – Text of Federal Rules\ has been updated with a complete and formatted CFR reflecting the new changes.
  • The various element affected template directories have been updated with Element Written Plans that incorporate the new CFR text AND modified policies to comply with the rule changes
    • 01 – EPA RMP
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
    • 03 – Process Safety Information
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
    • 04 – Process Hazard Analysis
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
      • PHA Worksheet Template – REPLACE
    • 06 – Operator Training
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
    • 08 – Mechanical Integrity
      • MI-EL1 Form updated. You may just wish to modify the EAP/ERP line to reflect the new text rather than re-create the form.
    • 10 – Management of Change and PSSR
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
    • 11 – Incident Investigation
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
    • 12 – Emergency Planning and Response
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
      • NEW Form EAP-C – Implement
    • 13 – Compliance Audits
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE
      • Optional Combined PSM RMP Compliance Self-Audit Checklist – REPLACE
    • 14 – Trade Secrets
      • Element Written Plan – REPLACE

 

EPA links for new information:

  • Updated CFR (aka “law”) from eCFR: link (37 Pages)
  • Federal Register Notice including reasoning for changes: link (83 Pages)

New Year, “New” SOP Format

The spirit of Christmas may be behind us, but the spirit of Continuous Improvement never leaves us alone. (for better or worse, lol)

After months of minor changes and revisions off-line, the 2020 SOP templates have been released. Please note: These are IMPROVEMENTS, not compliance or safety-critical changes. As such, there is no need to go back and change your existing SOPs. We would, however, suggest you use these new formats as you implement new SOPs. Of course, it’s possible, you may want to take advantage of some of the features of these new SOP templates, and you’re welcome to convert to them if you have the time.

Changes to ALL SOP Templates:

  1. Moved “Covered Equipment” to “Objective” section which eliminates Document Info section.
  2. Moved “Related Documents” to “Objective” which eliminates Related Documents section.
  3. Removed “SOP Objective” from first section as the objective is repetitive and explained clearly in the Written Plan. (It’s the first text box of the SOP so it’s fairly obvious what the function is!)
  4. Made Safety Warning triangle smaller and made the warning RED. This change (among others) frees up a bit of room for the Safety, Health, Environmental and Equipment Considerations section
  5. Moved the Operator Requirements concerning authorization to the top of the Safety, Health, Environmental and Equipment Considerations section thus eliminating the Operator Requirements section. Also provided a callout to the operator to check their OT1 to ensure they’re qualified to perform the procedure.
  6. Modified the Operating Phase flowchart section layout to take up less space.
  7. Minimized the left-hand column which shows what “Section” you are in to 1” width to take up minimal space. Centered the section text.
  8. Placed Headings between sections. This required splitting up the various Operating Phase / Procedural sections but makes navigation much easier if being used in WORD or PDF format.
  9. Added complementary color to enlarged text “body” sections of Operating Phase / Procedural Sections.
  10. Valve / Component List given a header. Sub-header appropriately colored.

Why did we make those format changes?

  1. Those changes yield a slightly shorter SOP format (average 1 page loss per SOP)
  2. These are collections of various suggestions we’ve received over the past year from end-users.
  3. The resulting SOPs are much more visually appealing, especially on tablets.
  4. The resulting SOPs are much easier to navigate on tablets, which alot of users are implementing for their technicians.

 

Additional changes were made to some other SOP templates:

  1. HPRTSR: Updated the System Charging procedural section based on user feedback.
  2. HPR: Added a Cylinder Charging procedural section for those users that want that option.
  3. LEO: Traditional Permit LEO was simplified and now only has “Existing SOP,” “With Drain Valve,” and “Without Drain Valve” sections. The previous 4 possibilities was confusing to some and this one seems to be easier to understand.

Direct Replacement, Replacement in Kind and Management of Change

Of all the PSM/RMP requirements, the Management of Change element is the most consistently problematic. Most of the difficulty is in answering two questions:

  • The compliance question: Does the change you considering count as a “change” per the PSM/RMP rule.
  • The safety question: Does the change you are considering have the potential to affect the safety of the process?

Note, it is quite possible that you answer NO to the first question and YES to the second question.

 

The text of the Rule

1910.119(l)(1) – The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for “replacements in kind”) to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and, changes to facilities that affect a covered process.

From a compliance perspective, how broadly you interpret the “…changes to facilities that affect a covered process” portion dictates how many changes will be subject to this element.

Of course, there’s also a little window that allows you to avoid the MOC element if you classify the change as a “replacement in kind.” The rule provides a fairly useless definition of Replacement in Kind:

1910.119(b) …Replacement in kind means a replacement which satisfies the design specification.

The “replacement in kind” exception is routinely abused to avoid MOC. To understand this element better, let’s consider a few scenarios: Replacing a Valve, replacing a Motor, replacing an Ammonia Detector, and replacing a Condenser.

 

Example: Replacing a Valve

In this example, we’re replacing a valve with the same model, size, etc. Is this a change? Some people would call this a Replacement in Kind, but I would not. I would call this a Direct Replacement. It’s not kind of like the valve we’re replacing, it’s exactly like it. Such a change is outside the scope of the MOC element entirely.

What if we were replacing the valve with a different brand or model? Then we don’t know if it is a Replacement in Kind until we ask enough questions to assure ourselves that it satisfies the design specification. Some questions we might ask are:

  • Is it made of the same materials?
  • Does it have the same flow ratings / capacity?
  • Does it have the same mode of operation in manual and automatic?
  • Does it have the same Mechanical Integrity requirements?
  • Does it affect the PHA section that this equipment belongs to?

It’s quite possible that you answer enough questions to assure yourself that the replacement valve satisfies the design specification making it a Replacement in Kind. While this means it is outside of the MOC element for compliance purposes, we’d still recommend you document the rationale you used to determine that it meets these design specifications. You could even take this documentation one step further and declare that in the future all replacements of Brand A Model X valve with Brand B Model Y valve can be considered a Direct Replacement in this application.

 

 

Example: Replacing a Motor

A motor might be considered by some (incorrectly) to be outside of the MOC element because it doesn’t (usually) contain ammonia, but this is short-sighted. Remember, the MOC element is about Changes to…equipment…that affect a covered process. A motor for equipment that is part of your covered process would certainly fall within the scope of the element for consideration.

Ideally, we’re replacing the motor with the exact some one – a Direct Replacement that would place it outside the MOC element. But, if we are replacing it with another motor, we will be looking to prove that it satisfies the design specification so we can consider it a Replacement in Kind. Again, we need to ask questions:

  • Does it have the same electrical requirements (phase, voltage, etc.)
  • Does it have the same frame size?
  • Does it have the same RPM, duty rating, capacity, etc?
  • Does it affect the PHA section that this equipment belongs to?

Just like earlier in our valve example, it’s quite possible that you answer enough questions to assure yourself that the replacement motor satisfies the design specification making it a Replacement in Kind. While this means it is outside of the MOC element for compliance purposes, we’d still recommend you document the rationale you used to determine that it meets these design specifications. You could even take this documentation one step further and declare that in the future all replacements of Brand A Model X motor with Brand B Model Y motor can be considered a Direct Replacement in this application.

 

 

Example: Replacing an Ammonia Detector

Like earlier, with the motor example, a change to an ammonia detector might be considered by some (incorrectly) to be outside of the MOC element because it doesn’t (usually) contain ammonia, but this is short-sighted. Remember, the MOC element is about Changes to…equipment…that affect a covered process. You definitely consider these detectors as safeguards in your PHA, so we need to exercise some caution on this change.

If we’re replacing the detector with the exact same one, then it’s a Direct Replacement. If we’re replacing it with a different detector, we need to assure that it satisfies the design specification so we can consider it a Replacement in Kind. Again, we need to ask questions:

  • Does it have the same electrical requirements?
  • Does it have the same output signal / alarm outputs?
  • Does it have the same sensitivity?
  • Does it have the same Mechanical Integrity requirements? The same calibration equipment, schedule and calibration procedure?
  • Does it affect the PHA section that this equipment belongs to?

In my experience, unless you are dealing with a Direct Replacement, no detector meets the requirements for a Replacement in Kind because they almost all fail the last question on calibration equipment, schedule and procedure. That means such a change would require the implementation of a Management of Change procedure.

Here’s where we can get a little clever. The PSM/RMP rules require that we “establish and implement written procedures to manage changes” but they don’t require that we use the same procedure for every change! If we sit down and think through all we need to do to successfully change from Brand A Model X NH3 detector to Brand B Model Y NH3 detector, we could establish a standard procedure for doing so. That means that in a facility with, say, 45 detectors that you are changing over a period of time, you have a Single MOC (to establish the new procedure) and then simply implement the new NH3 Detector Change SOP 45 times as the changes occur.

 

 

Example: Replacing a Condenser

In this example we’re replacing a brand A evaporative condenser with 500 tons of capacity with a brand B evaporative condenser with 500 tons of capacity. Note: this would work the same with if you were replacing it with a different model of brand A as well. Also, if you were replacing a condenser with an exact duplicate, then theoretically you may be able to get by with a PSSR, but that assumes you don’t need any non-standard operating modes during the change-out.

First question: Is it a change to equipment which satisfies the design specification? Answer: Well, I don’t know because there is a lot that goes into that determination. But every part of a condenser changeout has the potential to affect the safety of your system. Questions you should ask include:

  • Does it have the same electrical requirements (phase, voltage, amp draw, etc.)
  • Is it have the same size and weight?
  • Is it made of the same materials?
  • Does it have the same flow ratings / capacity?
  • Does it have the same mode of operation in manual and automatic?
  • Does it have the same Mechanical Integrity requirements?
  • Does the P&ID need to be updated?
  • Does the SOP need to be updated?
  • Does it affect the PHA section that this equipment belongs to?
  • …and the list goes on.

While it is technically possible that you could ask these (and 100 other) questions concerning a condenser replacement in such detail that you ensure it satisfies the design specification, you are going to want to document all that work. I’ve personally never seen it happen unless it was the same make and model. In our opinion, the best way to document all that work is by following the Management of Change procedure.

 

Closing Thoughts

Management of Change is a difficult element. But by working this element, you can find and address hazards before they are introduced to your process. There’s very little that can be said about it better than this advice from the Petroleum NEP:

OSHA’s MOC requirement is prospective.

The standard requires that an MOC procedure be completed, regardless of whether any safety and health impacts will actually be realized by the change. The intent is, in part, to have the employer analyze any potential safety and health impacts of a change prior to its implementation. Even if the employer rightly concludes there would be no safety and health impacts related to a change, 1910.119(l)(1) still requires the employer to conduct the MOC procedure.

PSM is a Thief!

The view that PSM is a time-sink.

A common push-back from facilities that are covered under the OSHA PSM and EPA RMP regulations is the sheer amount of resources these programs require to successfully design, implement, and maintain.

One phrase, seared into my memory, is from a frustrated and over-burdened maintenance manager: “PSM is a thief!”

He was referring to the fact that he had to task high-performing, highly trained and highly compensated personnel to perform Process Safety tasks. Time spent on Process Safety is obviously time that isn’t spent elsewhere.

My counterpoint at the time was “Safety isn’t earned – it is rented. And the rent is due every damned day

After an experience I had last week, I think there’s a better way to respond. I’d like to share my new response with you, but first let’s talk about the experience that made me see a new way of approaching this issue.

 

The experience

During the recent RETA conference the guest speaker was Jóse Matta. Jóse suffered ammonia burns over 40+ percent of his body when a condenser failed in an overpressure event. The event involved a portable ammonia refrigeration system. Before transport the system is drained of ammonia. In this incident, the driver placed a cap on the relief valve outlet due to DOT concerns. However, once the unit arrived onsite, the capped relief valve wasn’t noticed. Eventually this led to an overpressure event once the unit was charged and started.

Jose Matta barely survived his exposure. He nearly died in the hospital. His wife was brought into the burn unit to say her final goodbyes to her husband – the father of their children. When he was lucky enough to survive, he had to endure multiple surgeries. He no longer has a sense of smell and can barely taste food. He no longer has the ability to sweat and has to constantly monitor his condition when it’s hot out to avoid heat-stress or heat-stroke.

 

What does Jose’s experience have to do with “PSM as a thief?”

Post-incident, several failures of the PSM program were noted:

  • Pre-Startup Safety Review failed to identify the capped relief.
  • SOPs and Training on startup either weren’t adequate to control the hazards, or weren’t followed.
  • Setup time and tight scheduling, location of safety showers, weren’t adequately addressed in the PHA.
  • The MI program didn’t ensure that the high-discharge-pressure interlock worked.
  • The technician and contractors at the site weren’t familiar enough to know there was a safety shower located in a nearby building.
  • The EAP didn’t provide adequate information to the facility or responders, leading to them delaying effective treatment.
  • There was no command system in place. Nobody called 911. Nobody took charge. Nobody met the responders when they arrived to explain what was going on.

If the Process Safety items above were properly in place, the incident either wouldn’t have happened, or the outcome would have been significantly better for Jóse.

You see, when I pushed back from the “PSM is a Thief” argument before, I was wrong. I should have agreed with that statement.

 

PSM *is* a thief. Yes, it takes resources, but it can also take a LOT more from you!

PSM can steal from you: the opportunity to nearly die in a chemical release.

PSM can steal from your family: the opportunity for tearful goodbyes.

PSM can steal from you: years of surgeries, painful rehabilitation, and diminished health.

 

Yeah, PSM is a thief. I’m plenty happy to have these experiences stolen from me and the people I work with.

Without Process Safety, people are taking risks without knowing they are taking them. NOBODY should have to do that.

If you want your Process Safety program to steal these experiences from your facility, your coworkers, your neighbors, and YOU, we can help!

OSHA Inspections – Video Daily Double

OSHA has posted a video on the “OSHA Inspection Process” to give you a general idea of what to expect during an OSHA inspection.

Don’t forget to watch our longer video on how to PREPARE for and MANAGE that inspection including what you can do AFTER it do deal with the aftermath!

If you need help preparing for, managing, or dealing with the aftermath of an OSHA or EPA inspection, please contact us.

Dealing with non-standard (non-routine) work in your Process Safety program

Occasionally we come across an issue we’ve customarily addressed, but never documented. Put another way: We realize we have a policy – even if an informal one – on how to deal with certain situations, but we’ve never turned that policy into a formal, written one.

It’s incredibly common to have these informal policies in smaller departments, or when a task is rare. You can usually identify them after-the-fact when you are told “That’s just the way we do things here. Everybody knows that.”

When we find these items in our Covered Processes, we should endeavor to document them. Today I’d like to talk about a big one: What do we do when the existing written procedures don’t match with the conditions or situations we are facing in our work. What written guidance are you providing to your Process Operators and Technicians on how to deal with this situation?

Every functioning Operations / Maintenance department has a policy – even if an informal, undocumented one – on how they deal with this issue.  

For years I’ve relied on the text in the SOP Written Plan concerning Temporary Operations:

The ammonia system is not operated in any temporary modes without a written SOP. If a component requires maintenance or replacement, that portion of the system is isolated and removed from service through a written SOP. Other Temporary Operations are handled through the MOC element which will ensure supervisory oversight. Temporary Operation SOPs are often via a written modification of an existing SOP in the form of an addendum.

This worked well, but it was a little bit obscure and (understandably) only thought to apply to SOPs themselves. That needed to change. What we’ve done to our system today, is formalized and documented guidance on how to deal with these non-standard / non-routine situations.

A new policy was placed in the RMP Management System Written Plan…

To ensure integration of this policy, the following text was added to the Operating Procedures (Implementation Policy: Using an SOP – Performing a Procedure, and Implementation Policy: Operating Phases, Temporary Operations) and Mechanical Integrity (Implementation Policy: Mechanical Integrity Procedures or MIPs) element Written Plans: “The Implementation Policy: Non-Standard Work. Addressing Conditions / Situations outside of existing Procedures found in the RMP Written Plan should be used when site/equipment/system Conditions or Situations are found to be different than those anticipated in the exiting written procedures.”

Are you handling non-standard / non-routine work well in your Process Safety program? If you are, and have a better idea, we’re always open to improvements. If you aren’t handling it well, perhaps you can implement the example above? 


For Inside-Baseball type people: This chart was inspired by the API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 2201 Safe Hot Tapping Practices in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, Figure 3—Example Decision Process for Authorizing Hot Tapping. Other than genericizing that flowchart to cover all types of work, I also made two large changes:

  • Routed the post “change conditions” step back to the start so we re-evaluate the existing procedure considering changed conditions/situations rather than short-circuiting back to the Management step.
  • Rewrote the flow/wording so that Condition Changes are preferred over mere procedural changes. The thinking was that we should prefer more engineering-type changes over administrative ones, where possible.

 

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